WCQ Preview: Russian Hosts Slovenia for Leg 1

Though Russia’s matches against Slovenia have not been met with as anticipation as last month’s fixture with Germany, these matches are so much more important. That should go without saying, but given the ease with which even the most ardent supporter is settling into this match, a reminder of the stakes seems necessary.

While a win last month would have punched the national team’s ticket to South Africa, Russia still had a safety net. With Miroslav Klöse’s first half goal at Luzhniki, the Russians fell squarely into that net – their only lifeline – making this 180-minute-match against Slovenia a do-or-die affair. Beat the Slovenians, and the Russians render October’s Moskva result insignificant. Lose and all the progress that’s been made since the European Championships becomes meaningless.

Given the stakes, why isn’t this qualifier more anticipated? Why is the built-up lacking? Is it because the Germany match had almost a year’s worth of build-up (the time between when it become clear Group 4 was a two-team-race and the kickoff in Moskva)? Or, is it because of the latent assumption that Russia will roll over a Slovenian side lacking names like Arshavin and Akinfeev?

Supporters seem to see Slovenia as a speed bump. While there was some anxiety before the FIFA draw that paired the Russians and Slovenians, avoiding Ukraine elicited a small sign of relief. The nation Russia did get paired with became relatively insignificant.

Since the Russia-Slovenia pairing was announced, there has been little meaningful discussion of this match-up. The assumption: Russia got a good draw and is going through to South Africa. Break out the Baltika.

Those sentiments may be true, but failing to consider Slovenia’s chances not only reeks of over-confidence but also fails to recognize a number of points in the Slovenians’ favor. Slovenia survived the deepest UEFA qualifying group, a group where five of six members could have advanced out of another group. They have the best defensive record amongst nations that were draw into six nation groups and have a team comprised of players plying their trade in significant leagues across Europe.

Slovenia, Attacking Russia

Beyond their resumé, Slovenia has at least one significant tactical advantage.

Their ability to defend being a strong point, Slovenia could play conservatively an rely on the counter. If they did, they could exploit the left side of Russia’s back line – likely to feature Yuri Zhirkov at left back and Vasili Berezutski in the middle – with a strength of their attack: Robert Koren on the right, Miso Brecko coming up the flank in support, and Zlatko Didic coming from the middle to aid the build-up while leading scorer Milivoje Novakovic exploits a stretched back line.

Such a tact would attack the Russians at their weakest point. Zhirkov should not play, but he likely will. Given health considerations and their implications on form, Lokomotiv’s Renat Yanbaev is the Hiddink’s best bet at left back. Neither Yanbaev nor Zhirkov are going to win this match for Russia, but an out-of-form Zhirkov trying to deal with the right side of Slovenia’s attack could lose the match, particularly if Slovenia head coach Matjaž Kek uses his advantage correctly.

Playing A Little Poker, Slovenian Style

If Slovenia does have a decisive advantage in attacking Russian’s back left and Guus Hiddink doesn’t offset that by starting Yanbaev (and Denis Kolodin, who we’ll talk about later), it would behoove Kek to sit on that advantage. Try other ways to attack, bunker-in and just try to stay close after the first leg, but whatever you do don’t immediately show Hiddink that Russia has a fatal flaw.

If you start exploiting the flaw from the opening kickoff in Leg 1, you give Hiddink 180 minutes to adjust. Even if you are able to get two goals before that adjustment, it still leaves Hiddink and a talented squad too much time to adjust. If, however, you can maintain your form at the back, wait to strike, lull Russia into thinking the left side of their defense is solid, and pounce only after getting out of Russia drawn (or down a goal), then you not only maximize the impact of your attack but also give the Russians reason to doubt the left side is an actual problem.

“Zhirkov was fine for the 120 minutes before the goal, and now we need to get one back. I don’t see a need for a change.”

Holding back would be a strange approach for Slovenia. For some, this will seem over-complicating or antithetical. You go out and play and the best side wins, that thesis holds.

But Slovenia is not the best side.

If you listed the Slovenia and Russia starters in order of talent, you could argue that the twelfth through twenty-second spots on that list would be occupied by Slovenians. But football is not a game about individuals, and nobody’s ever shown a correlation between goals and abstract evaluations of “talent.”

Tactics are one of the things that help bridge the gaps between talented sides and the teams that can beat them. Slovenia does not have Russia’s talent, but if they’re willing to take some chances in approach, they can beat Russia.

This is not to say Slovenia will beat Russia. Even if this tactic could work, the Slovenians are unlikely to employ it. Implicit in this approach is the acknowledgement that Slovenia is not as good as their opposition, something very difficult for even the greatest underdogs to admit. Even if they admitted it, Russia would then have to play along by making poor choices along their back line, and while that seems likely, we still don’t know that Slovenia will properly execute a plan like this. Just because Russia has a weakness and Slovenia can exploit it does not mean Russian will lose.

And even if they execute the plan to perfection, their attackers must been Igor Akinfeev.

Russia, Attacking Slovenia

If Russia scores goals – something easier said than done against Slovenia – their problems in defense would be rendered moot. The last goal Slovenia allowed with April 1 in Belfast against Northern Ireland. Only one of their goals allowed was at home, and one of the four was a penalty kick. They did not allow more than one goal in any qualifying match.

But while Slovenia’s defensive record is impressive, understanding it requires some context. While Slovenia came out of the deepest UEFA group, the group was decidedly lacking in offensive power. If you take out goals scored in matches against San Marino (one goal for, 47 allowed), the group’s teams averaged only 1.1 goals per match. The group’s leading goal scorers were Euzebiusz Smolarek (Poland) and Stanislav Šesták (Slovakia), not quite Edin Dzeko (Group 5, Bosnia), Wayne Rooney (Group 6, England), or Klose (Group 4, Germany).

That would explain why Slovenia was able to post such a remarkable defensive record despite not playing particularly defensively. Just because a squad is good at defending does not mean they bunker-in and play conservative. Slovenia does a great job of maintaining their shape and keeping the play in front of them but does so within their 4-4-2. If, for the first leg, Kek replaces Valter Birsa (Auxerre, France) or Zlatko Dedic (Bochum, Germany) with Andrej Komac (Maccabi Tel Aviv, Israel), Slovenia will be even more likely to hold-out until Maribor.

What Russia does to break through Slovenia is simple: They execute.

Not even the most talented defensive teams have all the answers for Russia’s attack. Even when they were being shut out by Germany, Russia had numerous moments where their execution was the only thing keeping them from a goal. Slovenia will not give the Russians goals, but although they have that remarkable goals against record, the Slovenians have little to stop Russia from getting goals, provided sufficient ambition and execution.

That ambition and execution all comes down to Andrei Arshavin. He is their greatest goal scoring threat, their best playmaker, and their primary distributor. It will be incumbent on him to challenge the Slovenia defenders and create opportunities for Aleksandr Kerzhakov and Vladimir Bystrov. His movement will create space in the middle for Igor Denisov and Sergei Semak (should they start). Against a well-organized defense, Arshavin’s creativity is the one trait the Russians can rely upon to break their opponents down.

The Squads

Slovenia

As mentioned above, Slovenia play a fairly rigid, typical 4-4-2. All of their players play for major clubs across Europe, though the extent to which they play varies. Their leading goal scorer throughout qualifying has been Milivoje Novakovic (Köln, Germany) with five goals. No other players has scored more than twice, though five players have done that.

In addition to Novakovic, their main attacking threats are forward Zlatko Dedic, forward/midfielder Valter Birsa, and right midfielder Robert Koren (West Bromwich Albion, England). Koren is also the team’s captain and one of the players who have scored twice, though both of his goals came against San Marino.

Also in the midfield should be Tom’’s Aleksandr Radosavljevic (left midfielder) and Andraž Kirm (Wilsa Krakow, Poland). At the back – in front of goalkeeper Samir Handanovič – the Slovenians should player (left to right) Bojan Jokić (Sochaux, France), Boštjan Cesar (Grenoble, France), Marko Šuler (Gent, Germany), and Mišo Brečko (Köln).

Russia

Guss Hiddink surprisingly held Sergei Semak out of his starting XI for the Germany match, so predicting what he will do is more difficult than guessing Kek’s lineup. There are, however, a few people almost guaranteed to start.

Igor Akinfeev has continued to make his case as the best goaltender in the world. He will rarely be tested on Saturday, but when Slovenia asks questions, Akinfeev’s likely to have the correct responses.

In front of Akinfeev, Aleksandr Anyukov (right) and Sergei Ignashevich (right-center) are locks. Vasili Berezutski and Yuri Zhirkov are likely choices in the center and on the left, but the better choices would be Denis Kolodin and Renat Yanbaev.

In the midfield, the only sure bet is Vladimir Bystrov on the right. Sergei Semak is the next most likely to be chosen, but given what happened against Germany, that prediction needs to be qualified. Any of Igor Denisov, Konstantin Zyryanov, Igor Semshov, or Diniyar Bilyaletdinov could make up the other two spots.

Up top, Andrei Arshavin will support Aleksandr Kerzhakov, with the latter becoming a surprisingly consistent choice in (and performer for) this team.

What to Expect, Leg 1

This is a 180 minute match, and at some point the two sides should start treating it as such.

While it is possible the Russians will come out intent on establishing early control of the playoff, the match should eventually adopt a more even space. Either the Russians will have scored their first goals and adapted a slightly more protective approach or the Slovenians will have held out and, knowing they are in for a long, two-legged match, Russia will shift gears.

Prediction

On the podcast, both my co-host (Chris Riordan) and I picked Russia to score three goals. I thought Slovenia would get a goal while Chris thought Russia would keep a clean sheet.

Upon reflection, I find both of these predictions indefensible. Could those results happen? Of course. The history of the game has told us that. But to predict Russia will score three goals against a side that’s allowed only four in ten requires some special justification. While Russia did score three goals on four occasions through qualifying, they managed only one in 180 minutes against Germany. The team averaged 1.9 goals in their ten qualifiers.

Particularly given Slovenia will likely play conservatively and allow Russia to bring the match to them, I don’t see Russia getting the three goals I predicted Wednesday night. I look for Russia to control the match and, whether they do so as a tactic or for lack of choice, Slovenia to play much of the match on the defensive.

I like Russia to keep a clean sheet and win by one or two goals. A one goal win, and I think Slovenia is content. A two goal win, and I think Russia can be happy with their result.

Russia, 2-0